



Facts & Norms Workshop III

THE INDETERMINACY BETWEEN FACTUAL AND NORMATIVE JUDGEMENTS

PROGRAMME

THURSDAY 24 AUGUST 2017

12-1pm	Registration & Lunch
1-1.15pm	Introduction by Theresa Scavenius
1.15-2.15pm	Peter Vranas – <i>I ought, therefore I can obey</i>
2.15-2.30pm	Coffee/tea
2.30-3.30pm	Theresa Scavenius – <i>Ought implies can</i>
3.30-4pm	Coffee/tea
4-4.30pm	Naima Chahboun – <i>Accepted norms, contested facts</i>
4.30-5pm	Jakob Strandgaard – <i>The relationship between facts and norms</i>
5-5.15	Coffee/tea
5.15-6.15	Frances Howard-Snyder – <i>New questions about 'ought' Implies 'can'</i>
6.15-8pm	Reception & guided tour to Christiansborg Tower (Danish Parliament)
8pm	Workshop dinner, <i>The Tower</i> , Christiansborg Tower (Danish Parliament)

FRIDAY 25 AUGUST 2017

8.45-9am	Check-in & Coffee/tea
9-10am	Naomi Scheman – <i>On mattering</i>
10-10.15am	Coffee/tea
10.15-11.15am	Lars Botin – <i>Value-sensitive design in techno-anthropological perspective</i>
11.15-11.45am	Coffee/tea
11.45-12.45pm	Eva Erman – <i>Constraints on principles and normative freedom</i>
12.45-1.45pm	Lunch
1-45-2.45pm	Sune Lægaard – <i>Contextual political principles, specification and the problem of critical distance: The case of secularism as civic inclusiveness</i>
2.45-3pm	Coffee/tea
3-3.30pm	Oana Crusmac – <i>Mapping through the ideal</i>
3.30-4pm	Pedro A. Teixeira – <i>Beyond ideal and non-ideal</i>
4-5pm	Drinks & goodbye

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Organized by Theresa Scavenius

Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen

Venue: The Black Diamond, Seminar room: Blixen

Dates: 24-25 August 2017

The *Facts & Norms Workshop III* continues the work accomplished at the two previous workshops by advancing the conversation on the political relevance of political theory/philosophy in this urgent time of political polarization and de-democratisation.

The *Facts & Norms Workshops I and II* held in August 2013 and August 2015 discussed what role facts can play in the normative theorising. The result was a collection of papers espousing different views on how facts bear on political theory/philosophy. (These papers are accepted for publication in CRISPP in 2017). According to some of these contributors, political theory is unavoidably sensitive to various facts. Other contributors hold more conventional views on the pertinent relationship between facts and norms, while being open to the possibility that while facts bear on how fundamental normative principles apply to the world, these principles themselves make no factual assumptions.

The goal of *Facts & Norms Workshop III* is to take the discussion one step further by examining the essentially contested relationship between factual and normative judgements. We tend to assume that concepts, theories and facts have something important to say to each other. We talk about 'applying principles on political cases', 'justifying practices by referring to norms' and 'deriving implications of norms on facts'. However, how these relationships are constructed and determined remains under-theorised. What does it mean to say that 'one justifies a politics by normative principles' or that 'one applies normative principles to politics'?

The *Facts & Norms Workshop III* will question the relevance of theorising the relationship between factual and normative judgements by referring to 'justifying', 'applying' and 'deriving'. Instead, the workshop will examine the possibility of a fundamental *indeterminacy* between factual and normative judgements. On the basis of this, the workshop will propose alternative ways to comprehend the interlinkages between facts and norms. One such way may be fact-sensitive normative principles that theorise normative principles in light of factual concerns. Another way may be a pre-suppositional relationship where facts select relevant sets of normative principles. Yet another way may be methodological questions related to the argument that 'can' constraints have a bearing on normative principles: does 'can' imply 'ought'? To what extent can 'can'-constraints constitute a third type of judgements that draws on both factual and normative judgements but nonetheless appreciates that factual and normative judgement do not determine each other?